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RECENT CASE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FLAG
DESECRATION STATUTES-
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
P ARKER V. MORGAN' was an action brought in a United States District
Court challenging the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute
(N.C.G.S. section 14-381) which makes it a misdemeanor to publicly
desecrate the American flag. The object of the statute is to punish anyone
who places upon the flag, or who exposes to public view a flag upon
which has been placed, "any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing,
or advertisement" or anyone, "who shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile,
or defy, trample upon or cast contempt, either by words or act, upon
[the American flag]."' 2 The statute broadly defines "flag" to include any
flag or representation thereof "evidently purporting to be" the American
flag "upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in
any number of either thereof" or where "the person seeing the same,
without deliberation, may believe it to represent" the American flag.
It should be noted that the decision in Parker3 focuses upon the
broad constitutionality of the statute itself, rather than upon its application
to the individual plaintiffs. Therefore, the factual content of this decision
need only be considered briefly. Parker was arrested wearing a jacket on
the back of which he had sewn an American flag bearing the inscription
"Give peace a chance" and the depiction of a hand with the index and
middle finger forming a "V" superimposed thereon. He was subsequently
charged with having desecrated the American flag in violation of North
Carolina General Statute section 14-381. The other plaintiff, Berg, was
charged with the same crime for having affixed an American flag to the
ceiling of his automobile, in the process of which he had torn the flag
about the edges and pierced it with fasteners. Although the warrants
against both plaintiffs were subsequently quashed in the state courts, they
instituted this action contending that the continued enforcement of
N.C.G.S. section 14-381 would infringe upon their constitutionally pro-
tected rights. Upon examination of the North Carolina statute, in light
1322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. N.C. 1971).
2 N.C.G.S. §14-381.
3 322 F. Supp. 585.
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of the First Amendment and general principles of statutory construction,
the Court in Parker held the statute unconstitutional for vagueness and
overbreadth. In arriving at this decision, the Court developed several
constitutional clarifications of the permissible scope of such flag desecra-
tion statutes. However, it is the opinion of this writer that the Court's
reasoning is, in some instances, insufficient to justify the guidelines which
it seeks to formulate. The object of this note will be to identify these
guidelines and to evaluate the Court's rationale in developing them. In
addition, relevant sections of the Ohio flag desecration statute4 will be
discussed for the purpose of assessing the potential impact of the
Parker decision upon Ohio Law.
The Court in Parker prefaces its holding by affirming, without
discussion, the constitutional power of a state to exercise, on behalf of all
its people, reasonable control over flag usage and display to protect the
American flag from public acts of desecration.5 In so doing, it rejects
the argument that because the flag represents government and the official
policies thereof, such control of usage and display is absolutely forbidden
by the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court justifies its assertion
by reasoning that the flag represents those various and diverse viewpoints
of all who live under it. However, the Court concludes that North Caro-
lina has unreasonably exercised such power in the challenged statute.
The Court first determines that certain parts of N.C.G.S. section 14-
381 are phrased in terms so vague and indefinite as to their meaning and
application that the statute is unconstitutional and void.6 Focusing upon
the statutory definition of the word "flag", the Court distinguishes between
reasonable flag protection and what it terms "expropriation of color and
design". 7 It finds that the North Carolina statute unreasonably attempts
the latter because the statute may be applied to prohibit any and all uses
of the colors red, white and blue and the stars and stripes which may
appear to represent the American flag. The Court finds that there is no
valid state interest in proscribing acts such as the wearing of red, white
40mo REv. CODE §2921.05 (1967).
5 See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), where the United States Supreme
Court held constitutional a flag desecration statute similar to N.C.G.S. section 14-381
and observed that the public mutilation of the flag would "degrade and cheapen the
flag in the estimation of the people."
6 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). In Lanzetta, the Supreme Court held
a New Jersey criminal statute unconstitutionally vague and observed at 453:
A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
7 322 F. Supp. at 588.
[Vol. 5:1
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and blue trousers because such trousers are not an American flag.8
Reasoning that such a definition would imperil anyone who might wear
such colors, the Court holds that a valid flag control statute may protect
only that which it has explicitly defined to be an American flag.9 At this
point it should be observed that the Parker rationale avoids any consid-
eration of those state interests, if any, which justify the protection of a
precisely defined American flag. The significance of this omission by the
Court will be discussed more fully below. It should also be noted that this
rationale would cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the Ohio flag
desecration statute. A reading of the Ohio definition of "flag"' 10 reveals that
it encompasses the same area of protection as N.C.G.S. section 14-381,
rather than precisely defining the flag as required by the Parker decision.
In Parker the Court also found that the North Carolina statute was
unconstitutionally vague in prohibiting the placement of any word, mark,
picture or design upon the American flag. The Court found that this
section of the statute was unclear as to whether it prohibited the placement
of all marks or designs upon the flag or only those which may be consid-
ered to defile or cast contempt upon the flag. It would appear, then, that
Parker requires a valid flag desecration statute to precede this particular
section with the qualifying term "contemptuously." In this respect, the
comparable section of the Ohio flag statute would meet the requirements
of Parker because its terms are qualified in such a manner."
Parker thus holds that a state may constitutionally prohibit the
placement of any contemptuous mark or design upon that which it has
precisely defined to be the American flag. However, the rationale used by
the Court casts uncertainty upon the application of such a prohibition and
fails to justify it as furthering a valid state interest. For example, while it
assumes that there exists a valid state interest in proscribing contemptuous
marks and designs placed upon the flag, the Court proceeds to assert that
there may be no such state interest in prohibiting the placement of an
"embellishment" such as the Great Seal of the United States upon the
8Cf. State v. Nicola, 182 N.W. 2d 870 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1971), which held that the
exhibition of a flag with the thirteen red on white stripes and a peace symbol in
the blue field did not constitute desecration of the American flag: "It is the flag
of the United States which the law seeks to protect, not any flag which may happen to
have a prevailing scheme of red and white stripes." Id. at 872.
9 322 F. Supp. at 588.
10 OHIO REv. CODE §2921.05 provides:
As used in this section "flag," "standard," "color," or "ensign" includes any
flag, standard, color, or ensign or a picture or representation thereof, made of
or represented on any substance and purporting to be a flag, standard, color,
or ensign of the United States,... upon which is shown the colors, the stars,
and the stripes in any number thereof.
U OHIO REv. CODE §2921.05: "No person shall contemptuously print or place a
word, figure, mark, picture or design, upon a flag.... of the United States." (Empha-
sis added).
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flag. 2 In so doing, it would appear that the Parker rationale has intro-
duced into these types of cases the difficult question of whether or not a
particular design may be considered an embellishment, which is permis-
sible, or a contemptuous defilement which may be prohibited. In these
times, especially, it may be highly debatable whether a person who
superimposes a "peace symbol" upon the American flag has embellished
or defiled it. In contrast, the approach of Ohio courts has been to prohibit
any and all designs placed upon the flag, regardless of whether they might
be considered an "embellishment." In State v. Liska,13 an Ohio Municipal
Court reasoned that it was demeaning, and hence an act of contempt, to
affix any symbol or design to the flag for the purpose of mixed symbolism.
Thus, it concluded that because the flag represents various philosophies
and opinions, it would be demeaning to affix to the flag either a peace
symbol or the picture of a national hero. In this respect it might therefore
be contended that Ohio has avoided the ambiguity raised by the Parker
rationale. However, if the placing of such designs upon the flag is viewed
as speech or the expression of opinion in nonverbal form as opposed
to non-expressive conduct,14 the power of a state to constitutionally
prohibit such actions may be exercised only to the extent that it furthers
a valid state interest.'5 Because of this speech-conduct dichotomy in
the area of First Amendment freedoms and protections, it is of crucial
importance that the Court failed to examine the possible state interests
which may or may not justify a state in prohibiting the placement of
contemptuous marks or designs upon the American flag.
The Court in Parker also held that the scope of N.C.G.S. section
14-381 was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would prohibit forms
of expression protected by the First Amendment. Finding that the statute
prohibited the casting of contempt upon the flag by words, the Court held
that it was constitutionally void under the holding of Street v. New
12 322 F. Supp. at 589.
13 55 Ohio Ops. 2d 58, 268 N.E. 2d 824 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1970).
14 The United States Supreme Court has held that "nonverbal expression" by act or
gesture may be a form of speech within the meaning and protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), (black armbands in school); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931). (display of red flag).
15In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
defendant's conduct in burning his draft card could be proscribed, even though his act
was in protest of the Vietnam war, for the reason that there existed a sufficient gov-
ernmental interest in the prevention of draft card destruction which would justify any
limitations on the freedom of expression imposed thereby. The Court observed that:
"[w]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376,
(Vol. 5:1
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York.16 The Court further considered the statute's prohibition of the
expression of contemptuous defiance for the flag, and in holding this
prohibition unconstitutional, the Court evolved a new principle relating
to the permissible scope of flag desecration statutes. First, it recognized
that the First Amendment protects the expression of derisive and even
defiant protest toward government and what may be considered, rightly or
wrongly, its symbol (the American flag). The Court interpreted West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1 7 to have established the
principle that a state cannot constitutionally compel a person to make
affirmative gestures of respect for the American flag. On this basis, it
reasoned that it would be inconsistent to say that one is permitted to
verbally abuse the flag under Street's and yet be prohibited from making
derisive and defiant gestures toward the flag. Thus, the Court concludes
that a state cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, punish an
individual who expresses defiant protest toward the flag by gesture or
facial expression. Such conduct, according to the Parker decision, is
constitutionally protected symbolic or nonverbal expression which a
state may not prohibit as the North Carolina statute attempted to do
by the breadth of its terms.
The Parker court emphasizes, however, that its decision should not
be construed so as to preclude even minimal state control over the
American flag in order to protect it from public acts of physical
desecration. The Court notes that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has apparently held that a state cannot forbid even the physical alteration
or destruction of the American flag or prescribe the proper usage thereof
in the interest of maintaining the integrity of and proper respect for the
16 394 U.S. 576 (1968). In Street, the defendant, angered by the shooting of James
Meredith by a sniper in Mississippi, had burned an American flag on a street corner
and had proclaimed, "We don't need no damn flag." Finding that under the New
York flag desecration statute defendant might have been convicted solely on the basis
of what he had said about the flag, the Supreme Court declared the statute unconsti-
tutional and held that a state is constitutionally prohibited from punishing a person
who publicly casts contempt upon the American flag by words alone.
17 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Supreme Court, in Barnette, held it violative of the First
Amendment guarantee of free expression for a state to require unwilling school
children to salute the American flag. In rendering this decision Mr. Justice Jackson
observed:
Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Id. at 641-642.
1s394 U.S. 567. In Street, Mr. Justice Harlan stated at 593:
We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed "freedom to be intellec-
tually ... diverse or even contrary," and the "right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order," encompass the freedom to express
publicly one's opinion about our flag, including those opinions which aredefiant or contemptuous.
Winter, 1972] REcENrr CASE
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flag.19 The Court in Parker rejects this position and, without discussion,
appears to affirm the concept that a state has a valid interest in protecting
the integrity of what it defines to be the American flag. The Court thus
holds that in the furtherance of these unidentified state interests, a state
may constitutionally protect the American flag from disrespectful "acts
of physical contact such as mutilation, defiling, defacing or trampling" 2
regardless of whether such acts might also be viewed as the symbolic
expression of ideas and opinions.
Viewed against the Parker rationale, the comparable section of the
Ohio flag statute would appear constitutionally firm.3 This section
prohibits only those acts of contemptuous physical contact with the flag
which the Parker decision would permit. Indeed, the phrase "otherwise
cast contempt" included in this section of the Ohio statute has been
interpreted as being limited to the prohibition of only those types of
physical flag abuse described by the preceeding terms of the section.2 2
In concluding that a state may prohibit contemptuous physical
contact with the "defined" American flag, the Parker rationale again
appears deficient in its failure to discuss or even identify precisely those
state interests which justify the existence of such power. As indicated
previously, this deficiency appears to be of crucial importance in evaluat-
ing the applicability of the Parker decision in light of First Amendment
standards. In permitting a state to prohibit the placement of contemptuous
designs or marks on the American flag, Parker is consistent with its
holding that a state may prohibit contemptuous physical contact with the
flag. However, as noted earlier, where such contemptuous physical contact
with the flag becomes a medium for the expression of opinion, the
constitutional validity of state prohibition thereof will depend upon
the state interests furthered thereby.2 3 It might be inferred from the
Parker opinion that the Court recognized a valid state interest in
maintaining proper respect for the flag by regulating its usage and display.
Other state interests which may be advanced by prohibiting acts of
physical flag desecration include the prevention of breaches of the peace
19 See Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F. 2d 344, 349
(2d Cir. 1970):
Such an interest, while wholesome on its face, has no place in a free society
when, as in [the New York statute] it in effect requires worship of the flag by
compelling a series of taboos concerning flag display. Thus, in absence of any
valid state interest in the many flag uses and alterations which [the New York
statute] proscribes, are protected by the First Amendment and cannot consti-
tutionally be forbidden.
20 322 F. Supp. at 590.
21 OHIo REV. CODE §2921.05 provides: "No person shall... publicly mutilate,
burn, destroy, defile, deface, trample upon, or otherwise cast contempt [upon the
American flag]."
22 State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79, 268 N.E. 2d 135 (1969).
23 Supra notes 14 and 15.
[Vol. 5:1
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or the protection of the sensibilities of passers-by who might be offended
by an act of flag desecration. 24 In Ohio, certain flag uses considered as
desecrations have been prohibited on the theory which was apparently
approved of in Parker, that there is a valid state interest in maintaining
proper respect for the flag.25 Although the validity of these interests have
been unquestioned where elements of symbolic expression are not
involved, there has been diverse opinion where an act such as flag burning
is intended by the burner to express an opinion.26 Under the Parker
rationale a state could prohibit and punish such an act without considera-
tion as to whether such prohibition and punishment may stifle those
guarantees of free expression in the First Amendment. However, there is
case authority to the effect that where an act of flag burning is viewed as
"symbolic speech" the state interests in preventing breaches of the peace,
in maintaining proper respect for the flag, or in protecting the sensibilities
of others may be insufficient, in a given context, to justify a state in
prohibiting and punishing the actY The writer should not be interpreted
as contending that the Parker court correctly or incorrectly reserved
certain powers of flag protection to the state. On the basis of the
preceding discussion, it is this writer's opinion that the reservation of such
powers to the state by the Court in Parker is of questionable validity
because it is left unbuttressed by a searching examination of the state
interests which may be furthered by the exercise of such power.
Viewed in its broad perspective, Parker v. Morgan has further
clarified and circumscribed the constitutional limits of the state's power to
24 394 U.S. at 591.
25 See State v. Bunch, 54 Ohio Ops. 2d 354, 268 N.E. 2d 831 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1970).
The Court in Bunch held that defendant, who had folded and tied an American flagto make a knapsack in which he carried personal items, and who had spread theflag out on the ground, was guilty of casting contempt on the flag in violation of
the Ohio flag statute. Although the defendant testified that he was carrying the flagin memory of his friends in Vietnam, the Court stated:His intent was clear; he was acting out his discontent by treating the national
symbol of a government under laws and not of men in a disrespectful and
contemptuous manner-he was doing his thing at the expense of all other
citizens....
Id. at 355, 268, N.E. 2d at 832.
26 See Sutherland v. DeWold, 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. I1. 1971), holding the Illinoisflag desecration statute constitutional as applied to plaintiffs, who publicly burned anAmerican flag, in view of the state interests in preserving the public peace and inpreserving the flag as a symbol of unity on national ideals and purposes. Contra,Crossen v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970), which held that plaintiff'sburning of the American flag was protected "symbolic speech" under the FirstAmendment and that such conduct could not be constitutionally prohibited becauseit did not affect the state's interest in preventing breaches of the peace.27 See Crossen v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D.C. Ariz. 1970). By way of dictum theDistrict Court observed that a state does not have the power to prohibit physical acts
of flag desecration based on its interests in preserving loyalty or patriotism, insuringproper respect for the flag, protecting the sensibilities of passers-by, or on the theorythat such acts may stimulate viewers who sympathize with the opinions of thedesecrator to engage in unlawful acts such as rioting.
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protect the American flag from public acts of desecration. In this respect
it may be considered to provide further insight into the constitutional
questions involved in this relatively untouched area of the law. However,
until authoritative consideration has been given to the nature and source
of those protective powers which are reserved to a state, Parker v. Morgan
cannot be regarded to have drawn the ultimate lines of demarcation for
the constitutional validity of flag desecration statutes. A meaningful
attempt to draw such lines must find its premise in the identification and
searching examination of the state interests to be furthered by the
prohibition and punishment of flag desecration.
BRucE C. HEsLOP
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 5 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss1/7
